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I. INTRODUCTION
I am deeply honored this morning; first, by the kind invitation
that Professor Robert Barker extended to me to be the keynote
speaker at the Separation of Powers in the Americas . . . and Be-
yond seminar at Duquesne University School of Law; and second,
by representing the Inter-American Bar Association ("IABA")1 as
its Immediate Past President at this seminar. Thank you for hav-
ing me here; thank you for this wonderful opportunity.
Founded in 1940 in Havana, Cuba, by a group of distinguished
jurists representing 17 nations of the Americas and 44 bar asso-
ciations, the IABA champions the rule of law as the foundation of
a just and free society in the Western Hemisphere. Just recently,
the IABA joined forces with the American Bar Association and
other institutions to launch and implement the World Justice Pro-
ject ('WJP"), a program designed to create awareness and to em-
phasize the importance of the rule of law around the world. 2
At the World Justice Forum that was held at the close of the
WJP in Vienna, Austria, in July of 2008, along with a rule-of-law
index and a vast collection of scholarly work, the WJP planted
* Renaldy J. Gutierrez is the Immediate Past President of the Inter-American Bar
Association (June 2007-June 2008). Mr. Gutierrez is a practicing attorney with offices in
Miami, Florida, and is admitted to practice in Florida and Nicaragua.
1. Its members include bar associations, individual lawyers, law firms, and law
schools from the Americas and Europe. The IABA offices are located at 1211 Connecticut
Avenue, N.W., Suite 202, Washington, D.C. 20036, and online at www.iaba.org.
2. The WJP is a multinational and multidisciplinary American Bar Association
("ABA") initiative founded by former ABA President William H. Neukom (2007-2008). For
more information, please visit www.worldjusticeproject.org.
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throughout the world the notion of the rule of law as "the founda-
tion for communities of opportunity and equity."
3
Four universal principles compose the rule of law for the pur-
pose of the WJP:
1. The government and its officials and agents are account-
able under the law;
2. The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and fair, and protect
fundamental rights, including the security of persons and
property;
3. The process by which the laws are enacted, administered,
and enforced is accessible, fair, and efficient; and
4. The laws are upheld, and access to justice is provided, by
competent, independent, and ethical law enforcement offi-
cials, attorneys or representatives, and judges who are of suf-
ficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the
makeup of the community they serve.
These principles and the idea of the rule of law enunciated
above imply other intrinsic and interrelated concepts that must be
present if we are to talk about the rule of law at all. Paramount to
this notion is the human being, the integrity and rights of whom
the state is meant not only to protect and respect, but also to cre-
ate the necessary conditions for individuals to prosper and be
happy. There, we also find the principle of democracy as the po-
litical form of government that begins and ends with the human
being as its very expression and the citadel for the protection of
human rights.
4
Thus, we come to the realization of the existence of two inter-
connected concepts: democracy (a political form of government)
and the rule of law (the legal framework in which democracy ex-
3. The World Justice Project, About the WJP,
http://www.worldjusticeproject.org/about (last visited May 15, 2009).
4. It has been claimed, even by Jean Jacques Rousseau, that democracy is such a
perfect system that it could only be achieved among angels. But that system has been
adopted as the norm for political organization in the Western Hemisphere. And it is also
reassuring for us that Catholic doctrine emphasizes its virtues, in the case of the rule of
law, as "a realistic vision of men's social nature, which requires adequate laws to protect
the freedom of all," and regards democracy as the system that "ensures citizen participation
in political options and guarantees to the people the possibilities of electing and controlling
their government officials, and that of removing them in due course in a peaceful manner."
Letter from Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter "Centesimus Annus" (May 1991).
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presses itself and in turn protects its integrity against detracting
or destructive forces). I submit to you that one cannot exist, at
least for long, without the other. More importantly, they both
nurture and support each other.
In contrast with this notion, we are witnessing today in the
Americas political actions clothed in legal arguments (or theories)
that erode the very foundations of democracy. We are also wit-
nessing populist movements clothed in democracy, which shackle
the free operation and function of the rule of law. And all this is
being carried on in the name of-and under the guise of-
democracy and the rule of law.
These actions are indeed a contradiction to the universal princi-
ples mentioned above; they are a negation of democracy itself and
of the rule of law. However, in their tactics, we detect an effort to
hide reality under a mask, as it were. Thus, it may be proper to
characterize and call these actions "Formal Democracy," the mask
of democracy, and the rule of law.
II. FORMAL DEMOCRACY
As democracy and rule of law are elusive concepts, each with
different meanings for different peoples in different parts of the
world, 5 this uncertainty has been exacerbated in Latin America,
giving birth to the era of Formal Democracy.
6
By Formal Democracy, I mean those efforts that governments or
political parties make to disrupt democracy and the rule of law
while using methods usually associated with the democratic free
play of ideas. Their efforts aim to constrict democracy itself, or, at
the very least, to tamper with its principles. The proponents of
Formal Democracy claim that if the judiciary is controlled by the
executive but the latter was duly elected, that is democracy; or if
the executive assumes legislative powers, but it is authorized by
the constitution, that is also democracy.
As a result, our Western-civilization understanding of democ-
racy and rule of law is being eroded, perhaps not so much by 20th-
century dictators but, as it were, from within. This erosion occurs
5. See Thomas Carothers, "Rule of Law Temptations," paper presented at WJP, Vi-
enna, July 2-5, 2008.
6. Theoretically, we may explain it in terms of the so-called natural states, that, al-
though they "have many of the same institutions as open orders, such as parties, elections,
markets, and judiciaries . . .they have limited access to organizations, lack competition,
and lack a perpetual state." (Barry R. Weingast, '"Why Developing Countries Prove Resis-
tant to the Rule of Law," WJP, Vienna, July, 2008).
Fall 2009 805
Duquesne Law Review
at times by the open manipulation of the democratic system itself,
but more often by subtle and concerted actions, difficult to detect
and even more difficult to guard against. Indeed, we are facing a
perversion of democracy and of the rule of law.
To illustrate this 21st-century assault on democracy, I would
like to refer to a constitutional crisis that took place in Nicaragua
in 2004-a "constitutional coup d'6tat" against former President
Enrique Bolafios that generated a flurry of national and interna-
tional legal decisions and legal actions that spanned four years,
with the most recent Supreme Court of Nicaragua decision ren-
dered in January 2008. 7 And the dust may not yet be settled.
A. The Players
e The president of Nicaragua, Enrique Bolafios, democrati-
cally elected in 2001 for a five-year term (2002-2007)
* The legislative power (or National Assembly), controlled by
two political parties, the Liberal Party and the Sandinista
Party, together holding more than two-thirds of the votes in
the National Assembly
D The Supreme Court of Nicaragua, integrated by political
appointees of the same two parties and equally divided, 50%
Liberals and 50% Sandinistas
7. A full chronology of the events is as follows:
* Government of Nicaragua in cooperation with the National Endowment for De-
mocracy, Democracia Secuestrada, October 2005 (Nicar) (hereinafter Democracica
Secuestrada). IVAN ESCOBAR FORNOS, ESTUDIOS JURIDICOS, 471-84 (Hispaner 2007).
0 Corte Centroam~ricana de Justicia [CCJ], Demanda interpuestra por el Seior
Enrique Bolaios Geyer, Res. 71, (Jan. 6, 2005), http://www.ccj.org.ni/resolnes/94-
05/Resol71.pdf (hereinafter CCJ Res. 71).
* Sentencia [S.] No. 17, 29 Mar. 2005, Boletin Judicial Vol. I [B.J.] [Supreme Court]
pp. 51-58, Cons. XI(i) (Nicar.).
a Ley No. 520, 13 Jan. 2005, Reforma Parcial a Ia Constituci6n Politica de la Repdi-
blica de Nicaragua [Partial Reforms to the Constitution of Nicaragua] No. 35, La Ga-
ceta [L.G.], 18 Feb. 2005 (Nicar.).
0 CCJ, Demanda por presunta "violaci6n a la normative juridical del Sistema de la
integraci6n Centroamericana" (SICA), Res. 69, (Mar. 29, 2005),
http://www.ccj.org.ni/resolnes/94-05/Resol69.pdf (hereinafter CCJ Res. 69].
* S. No. 17, 29 Mar. 2005, Boletin Judicial Vol. I. [B.J.] [Supreme Court] pp. 51-58,
Cons. VI (Nicar.).
0 S. No. 52, 30 Aug. 2005, Boletin Judicial Vol. II. [B.J.] [Supreme Court] pp. 421-
23, Cons. II, IV, and V (Nicar.).
0 Ley No. 556, 20 Oct. 2005, [Framework Statute for the Stability and Governance
of the Country] No. 203, La Gaceta [L.G.J, 20 Oct. 2005.
0 S. No. 1, 10 Jan. 2008, not yet published in the Boletin Judicial [B.J.] [Supreme
Court] Cons. III (Nicar.).
Vol. 47806
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The silent player and victim here, the people of Nicaragua, an
innocent bystander,8 saw the pendulum move from left to right,
perhaps not fully understanding why and how. But in the end,
their rights were violated, and their hopes for a better life were
betrayed by obscure forces. The irony is that those obscure forces
were the same powers of government that were supposed to work
for the prosperity and happiness of the people of Nicaragua.
B. Assault on the Presidency
Halfway into his five-year term, President Bolafios launched an
unprecedented anticorruption campaign that threatened the very
foundation of the Nicaraguan political establishment.9 In re-
sponse, the legislative power directed a three-prong attack against
the Bolafios government, consisting of:
a) "Partial" constitutional reforms10 that took away executive
powers and vested them in the legislative power (the National
Assembly), so much so that it virtually changed the Nicara-
guan presidential system into a parliamentary system by con-
centrating so much power in the legislative branch;11
8. Or guilty, perhaps?
9. Former President Arnoldo Aleman was in jail and had been sentenced to 20 years
on corruption charges; other former government officials were also in jail and prosecuted;
even the Catholic Church and the private sector's dealings with government property were
being brought into question. Bolafios's transparency in government and anticorruption
crusade irked and upset the Nicaraguan political interests and ruling class. Democracia
Secuestrada, supra note 7.
10. The Nicaraguan Constitution of 1987 allows partial-as well as total-
constitutional reforms (Articles 191-193). Partial reforms could be enacted by the legisla-
tive power as long as the reforms are passed in two successive legislatures. Total constitu-
tional reform would require a constitutional convention.
11. It was precisely the government's position that the so-called partial constitutional
reforms were substantial in nature, requiring a constitutional convention for approval.
First, the reforms shifted a series of executive powers, transferring them to the Assembly.
Second, it eliminated, to a certain extent, the checks and balances between the legislative
and executive powers. Third, it eliminated the independence of the executive, with respect
to the other branches of government, by subjecting it to the legislature. Fourth, it changed
the presidential system of government of the Nicaraguan Constitution by introducing into
it features that would be proper of a parliamentary system, foreign to the Nicaraguan Con-
stitution and political tradition. This is evident by the preamble to the partial reforms,
which states: "In the evolution of modern parliamentarism, the National Assembly is left
to be the only branch of government with legislative powers, truly representative of the
Nation, and therefore, placed in a superior hierarchical order with respect to the Executive
Branch of government. This political and legal supremacy of Parliament is translated into
a function of control over the government, which affirms the superiority of the former .... "
S. No. 51, 30 Aug. 2005, Boletin Judicial Vol. II. [B.J.] [Supreme Court] pp. 421-23, Cons. V.
(Nicar.).
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b) The enactment of several laws with the sole purpose of
bringing at least nine agencies or departments of the execu-
tive under the direct control of the Legislative power;12 and
c) An impeachment process brought against the President,
initiated by the National Assembly at the request of the Gen-
eral Accounting Office 13 as a result of an investigation on
campaign contributions in the 2001 elections.
Facing a virtual coup d'etat, President Bolafios sought protec-
tion, without avail, from local tribunals and from the international
community, where he found solid support-legal14 as well as po-
litical.15 Of particular importance to this presentation are the de-
cisions made by the Central-American Court of Justice ("CCJ")l6
and the Nicaraguan Supreme Court ("NSC"), to be discussed next.
12. Law # 511, "Law on the Superintendency of Public Services"; Law #512, "Law for
the Establishment of the Institute for Reformed Rural and Urban Property"; Amendments
to the Organic Law of Social Security Administration; Amendments to the Organic Law of
the National Technology Institute, among others.
13. Resolution by the Superior Council of the General Comptroller's Office (for simplic-
ity called the General Accounting Office), dated October 7, 2004. Without delay on October
14, 2004, a special meeting of the Assembly was called to appoint an Investigation Com-
mission against President Bolafios. See David R. Kolker, Council of Hemispheric Affairs,
An Unjust Attack on Nicaraguan President Bolafios, at
http://www.scoop.co.nzlmason/storiesfWO0411/SO0218.htm.
14. Based on Article 18 of the Democratic Charter, the Bolafios Government requested
the intervention of the Permanent Council and the Secretary General of the Organization
of American States to assist in the resolution of the crisis. On October 17, 2004, an OAS
High Level Mission was sent to Nicaragua (see Final Report of the Commission, October
18-20, 2004, OAS/Ser.G/CP/Doc. 3953/04 rev.1, December 7, 2004). The crisis generated
further involvement of the OAS until it was averted (see Minutes of the Permanent Council
Meeting of April 27, 2005, at OAS/Se.G/CP/ACTA 1479/05; Minutes of the Permanent
Council Meeting of June 21, 2005, at OAS/Ser.G/CP/Acta 1492/05; Resolution by the Gen-
eral Assembly in support of Nicaragua, emphasizing the principles of "separation and inde-
pendence of the branches of government in that country," AG/DEC.43 XXXV-O/05). The
foregoing information was taken from the Conference delivered by Dr. Jean Michel Arrighi
at the IABA XLIV Lima Conference, "Rule of Law and Governability," June, 2008. Dr.
Arrighi is the OAS Secretary for Legal Affairs.
15. Central American Presidents (Members of the Central American Integration Sys-
tem) signed a declaration in support of constitutional order in Nicaragua (XXV Ordinary
Meeting of Chief of States, San Salvador, December 15, 2005). Additionally, the Andean
Pact and the Group of RIO issued declarations in support of the constitutional order and
against the constitutional reforms. Democracia Sequestrada, supra note 7; CCJ Res. 69, at
Cons. III(e).
16. The CCJ is a supra-national regional tribunal created by treaty among the Central
American States under the Interamerican System. Jurisdiction of the CCJ was based on
Article 22(f) of its governing law ("Estatuto de la Corte"), which allows the Court to "review
and adjudicate at the request of an aggrieved party over conflicts that may ensue between
Powers or Branches of Government of the States . . . ." Jurisdiction was further based on
the Tegucigalpa Protocol to the OAS Charter of December 13, 1991, and the Framework
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C. Judicial Decisions
As a result of an action filed by President Bolafios, the CCJ
made two decisions: first, an interlocutory decision 17 ordering the
Nicaraguan Assembly to suspend the ratification process of the
constitutional reforms, which was not followed by the Assembly;
and subsequently, its final decision 8 declaring the constitutional
reforms to be in violation of the rule of law in Nicaragua because
they eroded the powers and independency of the executive branch
and could only be approved by a constitutional convention.
In contrast, the NSC first suspended the CCJ interlocutory de-
cision on purely formal grounds. 19 Then, on the same day that the
CCJ rendered its final decision, the NSC declared unconstitutional
Article 22(f) of the enabling statute of the CCJ and rejected Presi-
dent Bolafios's complaint. In its decision, the NSC made a super-
ficial analysis of the constitutional reforms and simply stated that
the reforms
... only increase the scope of the current [constitutional] text
without contradicting the functions granted to the President,
which come indeed to strengthen the Rule of Law, by creating
mechanisms of coordination between the two Powers of the
State, and consequently there is no legal basis for a conflict
between the Powers as alleged by claimant.
20
The Court said nothing about the shift of power (from the execu-
tive to the legislative branch), about the resulting concentration of
power in the legislative branch created by the constitutional re-
form, or about its impact on the presidential system of the Nicara-
guan Constitution. Instead, the Court dealt with the problem
primarily on procedural grounds, explaining at length the types of
constitutional reforms under the Nicaraguan Constitution and
Treaty for Democratic Security in Central America of December 15, 1995. CCJ Res. 71, at
Cons. I and II.
17. See CCJ Res. 71, http://www.ccj.org.nilresolnes/94-O5fResol7l.pdf.
18. See CCJ Res. 69, http://www.ccj.org.ni/resolnes/94-O5/Resol69.pdf.
19. Decision of January 7, 2005, indicating that the Nicaraguan internal proceedings
have not been exhausted and that constitutional challenges in Nicaragua are governed by a
special Nicaraguan Constitutional Law (known in Spanish as Law of Amparo, which pro-
vides for constitutional remedies to guarantee the rights set forth in the Constitution). S.
No. 17, 29 Mar. 2005, Boletin Judicial Vol. I. [B.J.] [Supreme Court] pp. 51-58, Cons. XI(i)
(Nicar.).
20. S. No. 17, 29 Mar. 2005, Boletin Judicial Vol. I. [B.J.] [Supreme Court] pp. 51-58,
Cons. VI (Nicar.).
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concluding that the legislature was empowered to pass partial re-
forms to the Constitution.
21
There was yet another decision by the NSC on another chal-
lenge against the partial reforms. 22 In that instance, although the
Court declared the unconstitutionality of two specific aspects of
the reforms, it looked only to the periphery of the problem; thus,
the Court invalidated as unconstitutional the preamble of the
statute discussed above, 23 as well as certain language added to the
reforms 24 that they would be effective at a later time.
25
D. The Aftermath of the Constitutional Reforms
With the judicial battles lost and the constitutional reforms in
full force and effect, the Bolafios government turned to negotia-
tions with the "political players" to defer its application until after
the end of his term in January 2007.26 As a result of those nego-
tiations, in October 2005, the Nicaraguan Assembly passed the
Framework Law for Stability and Governance of the Country,
whereby the partial constitutional reforms were to enter into ef-
21. By ignoring the allegations that the constitutional reforms attempted to change the
system of government, the NSC circumvented the application of its own jurisprudence
(NSC Decision #8 of May 8, 1995, in which the Court held that "for constitutional reforms
to be total [and therefore requiring a constitutional convention] they should affect the exis-
tence of the state or the form of government or its democratic inspiration..." as it was in
the case at issue). S. No. 8, 8 May 1995, Boletin Judicial Vol. 17, [Supreme Court] p. 12,
Cons. II (Nicar.).
22. S. No. 52, 30 Aug. 2005, Boletin Judicial Vol. II [B.J.] [Supreme Court] pp. 421-23,
Cons. IV. (Nicar.).
23. See supra note 11. The irony of this portion of the decision is that by invalidating
the Preamble of the Statute that enacted the reform, the Court purports to uphold the
independence and division of powers that were otherwise eroded if not nullified by the
reforms themselves that the Court had left intact.
24. The language in question read as follows: [The constitutional reforms would be
effective] only "by consent of the three principal political players in the country: the two
major parliamentary [political parties] groups and the Government." S. No. 52, 30 Aug.
2005, Boletin Judicial Vol. II [B.J.] [Supreme Court] pp. 421-23, Cons. IV (Nicar.).
25. The basis for this portion of the NSC decision was the fact that this language was
added by the National Assembly in its second debate and was not included in the reforms
initially approved by the legislator the previous year. A dissent by Dr. Ivan Escobar em-
phasizes the power of the Court to pass judgment on procedural grounds (in procedendo)
but not otherwise (in iudicando), although the dissenter hints at the need for a constitu-
tional convention in connection with the reform's drastic changes from the presidential
system to a parliamentary one. See Ivan Escobar Fornos, opinion cited, supra note 7, at
473.
26. Instrumental in those negotiations were OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel In-
sulza and OAS Secretary for Political Affairs Ambassador Dante Caputo, who met with the
political players in Nicaragua and propitiated a dialogue among the parties. As Dr. Arrighi
puts it: "The OAS fulfilled an important role by guaranteeing the full respect to the democ-
ratic regime in Nicaragua. President Bolafios was able to conclude his term and after de-
mocratic elections transferred power to his successor." See supra note 12.
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fect in January 2007, thus averting the legislative coup d'6tat
against the Government and allowing President Bolafios to finish
his term.2
7
During the constitutional crisis, we have seen the legislative
power twisting the words of Constitution to its side 28 and proceed-
ing to encroach on the executive branch. We have also seen the
NSC, with piecemeal (superficial) decisions, validating the politi-
cal takeover by the legislative branch. From their "constitutional"
points of view, for the legislative power, it was just a partial re-
form to the Constitution; and for the judiciary, it was a valid act of
Congress where the procedure, as provided for in the Constitution,
was followed and complied with. In short, form above substance
and the birth of Formal Democracy in Nicaragua.
Had the Nicaraguan legislative power understood that its
proper role is to legislate and to work with co-equal branches of
government for the common good of the people, those reforms
would never have been passed. Had the NSC understood that its
role was to preserve democracy and the rule of law, as consecrated
in the Nicaraguan Constitution, those so-called partial reforms
would have been declared unconstitutional.
III. CONCLUSION
It has not been our primary purpose to analyze the decisions of
the NSC or to pass judgment on the procedural grounds that led to
those actions in Nicaragua. Our purpose is to unmask evil by
showing truth-because truth shines in darkness.
If we have learned something from the IABA's 60+ years of
championing the rule of law or from last year's WJP, it is that de-
mocracy and the rule of law are not only matters of constitutional
dogma or, even less, of compliance with certain procedures. That
is what some political undercurrents in Latin America would like
us to believe. 29 There are indeed fundamental concepts and prin-
ciples, but above all, for those concepts to become part of the social
fabric, they need to be accepted by the people 30 and become a belief
27. On January 10, 2008, the NSC declared unconstitutional Law # 610 as well as
Laws #s 551, 512, 539 referred to above. See supra note 10. S. No. 1, 1 Jan. 2008, not yet
published in the Boletin Judicial [B.J.] [Supreme Court] Cons. III. (Nicar.).
28. To its political purpose of the season, to shackle the executive power.
29. I.e., the Chavez XXI Century Socialism and its followers.
30. When the U.S. Supreme Court has said in its many decisions that "it is a Constitu-
tion we are expounding," it is grounding its decision in the core beliefs of the people that
enacted the Constitution. In a way, we may argue that, in doing so, the Court went even
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system.31 In other words, it is imperative that those concepts and
principles are part of community consciousness and beliefs, a
common understanding of values worth living for-and dying for.
And so we go back, full circle, to the foundation of this construc-
tion, the human being, the individuals who vested the government
with certain powers and rights for that government to better pro-
tect their rights and to assure them a better life in happiness,
peace, and prosperity for all.32 Some may say that this is perhaps
an illusion, but I submit to you that there is no better truth.
above the plain text of the Constitution, searching for those values and beliefs that gave
way to the written Constitution. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).
31. Weingast, supra note 6.
32. There is a connection between the rule of law and economic, as well as political,
development. For one thing, investment (national or foreign)-the sine qua non component
of economic development-requires certainty in the rules of the game and the protection of
rights-property rights in particular-which only the rule of law can guarantee. See Rule
of Law, Economic Growth and Prosperity, Americas Society and Council of the Americas,
July 2007. The World Bank, "Government Matters V: Governance Indicators for 1996-
2005," The World Bank. Doing Business in 2007 (Washington, D.C.: International Finance
Corporation/The World Bank, September 2006). The World Bank, "World Development
Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for Everyone"
(http://go.worldbank.orgfWVDAOSZJ20).
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